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Reproducing Remoteness? States, internationals and the co-constitution of aid 
“bunkerization” in the East African periphery 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The physical and social retreat of international interveners behind the walls of 
‘bunkered’ aid compounds in (putatively) more remote and dangerous regions 
of the South has been the focus of growing critical attention in recent years. 
An increasingly remote and fearful culture of risk aversion and differentiation 
among Western states and organizations has been largely identified as the 
driving force behind this set of practices. This article presents a different 
perspective on the bunkerization phenomenon through focusing on the agency 
of Southern states in the process. Exploring bunkerization across east/central 
Africa – and in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali Region in particular – the study 
emphasizes not only how African states have been key promoters of modern 
bunkerization, but also how bunkerization behaviour and mentalities have 
historically characterized how many African borderlands – and contemporary 
sites of international intervention – have been incorporated into the global 
state system. 
 
Keywords: aid bunkerization; sovereignty; international intervention culture; 
Eastern Africa; agency 
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Introduction 
 
No image better captures the apparent physical and emotional withdrawal of the 
international aid and peacebuilding industries from the communities they seek to 
assist than that of the ‘fortified aid compound’. Perhaps most comprehensively and 
powerfully unpacked by Mark Duffield in the pages of this journal (Duffield 2010), 
the militarized structures which house and ‘protect’ UN, INGO and other 
international interveners in South Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia and elsewhere stand 
as a commanding metaphor for a conscious and fearful demarcation and defence of a 
separate ‘lifeworld’ (Rossi 2006) by ‘internationals’ in the midst of a foreign land. 
These compounds contain and secure the comforts and accoutrements of everyday life 
for their inhabitants (Higate and Henry 2010; Smirl 2015). Access is, however, 
restricted to a pre-cleared class of international associates – those who dwell within 
and subscribe to Severine Autesserre’s ‘dominant peacebuilding culture’ (2010, 2014) 
– with local actors not simply excluded but posited as unpredictable and threatening. 
For these and other scholars, the compound is the manifestation of a much 
broader process of mental and physical ‘bunkerization’ undergone throughout the 
international aid community in the context of an increasing militarization and 
securitization of development since the 1990s. A growing loss of ‘ground truth’ 
among interveners has followed, it is suggested, founded ultimately in risk aversion 
and a decline in solidarity between the North and South (Duffield 2010, 2014; 
Sandstrom 2014). Crucially, it is argued, this process is a relatively new one (Duffield 
2014, S82-S83). 
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The purpose of this article is to propose an alternative lens through which to 
understand international remoteness and aid militarization, critically examining the 
role of Southern states themselves in the aid bunkerization phenomenon. In doing so, 
the piece unpacks the linkages between historical patterns and practices of 
statebuilding on the one hand and contemporary international bunkerization on the 
other, focusing particularly on central and eastern Africa.  
For in much of eastern Africa state expansion, consolidation and governance 
by colonial, post-colonial and proto-colonial polities since the nineteenth century has 
contained marked similarities to those patterns of behaviour highlighted above. 
Indeed, governance through militarized encounters, garrisoned outposts and chains of 
local ‘brokers’ is not purely a feature of the contemporary aid industry in the 
peripheries of Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia but, in many respects, how the state and 
its technologies themselves came to parts of the African borderland. 
The drawing of this link is not intended as a device for suggesting that today’s 
interventionary practices in the South are simply an unconscious extension of 
underlying, historical practices of – often exploitative – governance. Instead, the aim 
is to feel a new path in the current literature on bunkerization which has, to date, 
largely overlooked the role of Southern states in driving the phenomenon and in 
shaping Western encounters with, and thus understandings of, many Southern 
communities. This is undertaken in the second part of the article through an 
exploration of contemporary ‘bunkerized’ interventionary practices in the Somali 
region of eastern Ethiopia (Somali Regional State or SRS).  
This latter section of the article draws upon interviews undertaken with senior, 
mid-level and operational officials in UN agencies, Western embassies and aid 
agencies, INGOs, implementing bodies, consultancy groups, risk analysis outfits and 
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Ethiopian state officials between March and May 2014 – all of whose focus has been 
on activities in SRS. Almost all respondents requested anonymity owing to the 
perceived political or commercial sensitivity of the information being provided (on 
security protocols, risk assessment procedures, development of funding bids etc). 
Consequently, while as much information as possible is provided, interviewees are 
cited without reference to names or, in some cases, organisations. Where the same 
designation is used for multiple interviewees, separate interviews are indicated with 
numbers (eg “Interview with UN official 2”). The remainder of the paper builds upon 
secondary literature along with interviews with international and state officials 
undertaken across the region in twelve fieldwork visits since 2009. 
In terms of case selection, the choice of the central/eastern African region 
reflects the heavy concentration of international intervention and bunkerization 
behaviour there since the 1990s. The comparatively high number of attacks on, and 
killings of, aid workers across this region – conceived of, by many, as a key driver of 
bunkerization protocols and bunkerized living by internationals – is also a central 
consideration.
1
 The varied nature and strength of the pre/post-colonial and colonial 
state across the region also provides a valuable differentiation of contexts in which to 
compare and contrast the relationship between state-building, intervention and state 
“hardness”/“softness”. For while the Ethiopian case study might alone be seen as 
exceptional, given the historical strength and territorial reach of that state’s political 
and security machinery, the fact that similar phenomena can be identified elsewhere 
in the region in states with historically much more distant relationships with 
peripheries underlines the broader regional generalizability of the article’s findings. 
The article begins by unpacking the literature on bunkerization before drawing 
parallels between practices identified here and those undertaken in many east African 
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border regions during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The SRS case is then 
analysed with a particular focus placed on the role of the contemporary Ethiopian 
state in promoting bunkerization practices among modern international interveners. 
The piece concludes by arguing for a greater appreciation of the role of states – and 
historical practices of state-building – in scholarly analyses of international 
intervention and knowledge construction. 
 
A note on terminology 
The terminological characterisation of different categories of actors at intervention 
sites stands at something of an impasse in contemporary critical peacebuilding 
scholarship. The binary distinction drawn by many policy-makers and scholars 
between ‘international’ and ‘national’/‘local’ is problematic in its degree of 
imprecision and essentialization (Heathershaw 2013). The lines between staff of 
donor institutions, aid agencies, INGOs, contractors and other ‘aid workers’, for 
example, are exceptionally blurred in many intervention sites, not only because the 
latter are often the implementers of the formers’ programmes but also because ‘local’ 
or ‘national’ staff often play a prominent role in many donor/INGO institutions in 
these contexts (Collinson and Duffield 2013).  
Likewise, the notion of a ‘local’ or ‘national’ actor, as distinct from an 
‘international’ one, obscures the vast differentiations relevant to any specific context. 
In Ethiopia, for example, highlander administrators and security personnel recruited 
and dispatched to oversee aid projects or other governance activities are perceived 
quite differently by lowlanders in SRS than those recruited from SRS itself; the 
former would certainly not be seen as ‘local’ by communities living in SRS, even if 
they are perceived as such by international organisations. The question of shared or 
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hybridized worldviews and epistemologies (Mac Ginty 2011) is also poorly captured 
in international/national/local distinctions particularly given the fact, as Autessere and 
Heathershaw argue, that the frames of reference and habitus for those working in 
intervention sites can be more meaningful to them than national or organisational 
origins (Autesserre, 2014; Heathershaw, 2016). ‘Local’ terminologies have also been 
critiqued for their romanticization of non-Western epistemologies and processes and 
for their normative, as opposed to conceptual, dimensions (Randazzo 2016).  
Scholars have attempted to resolve some of these ambiguities through 
qualifying some of these terms (eg Oliver Richmond’s local-local and local-
international) or through suggesting alternative categories of actor altogether 
(Heathersaw 2016; Richmond 2011). It remains the case however, in this author’s 
view, that a language that can recognise some of the important distinctions mentioned 
above at the level of abstraction required to render broader conclusions on the 
relationships between intervention and power has yet to be developed – and is perhaps 
impossible to develop satisfactorily. This article will therefore use specific 
terminology where possible but will use the term ‘internationals’ to refer to 
individuals employed by a multilateral or bilateral donor agency without 
consideration of their nationality as well as those Western employees of INGOs and 
consultancy firms working on and in SRS. Civilians and communities in intervention 
contexts will be referred to as ‘local’ while state officials will be referred to as that, 
with their status as regional, national or federal employees specified where possible.  
 
‘Defensive living’ between two worlds: bunkerization and intervention 
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The recognition and conceptualization of the defensive and militarized world of 
contemporary international intervention emerged from two key areas of enquiry. The 
first originated in debates in the 1990s on ‘human security’ and the relationship 
between ‘development’ and ‘security’ – both in terms of their symbiotic conceptual 
link but also the implications of this for developmental interventions (Beall et al 2006; 
Collier and Hoeffler 1999; Sen 1999; Stewart 2004). 9/11 and a range of military 
interventions by Western states – particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq but also Sierra 
Leone – nevertheless re-shaped this debate around the question of how far 
developmental resources were being ‘hijacked’ for military and defence purposes by 
Western donors, INGOs and others (Albrecht and Jackson 2015; Woods 2005).   
The ever-more blurred line between development project and security 
enterprise in the post-9/11 context has been the subject of heated debate among 
scholars and practitioners – not least because of a growing focus by the UN and 
Western governments on ‘re-constructing’ or, at least, ‘stabilizing’ “fragile states” 
(Mac Ginty 2012). For scholars such as Duffield, this reflects not just a cynical 
commandeering of Northern policy agendas by security cliques but forms part of a 
much wider and insidious attempt by neo-liberal Northern elites to regulate and 
govern the everyday lives of those in the South (Duffield 2001a and b, 2007). 
This critical commentary on the ‘securitization of development’ – which 
continues to rage – has increasingly come to focus on the spatial dimensions of 
intervention and aid delivery. The provision of aid supplies by Western security 
personnel in Afghanistan, Kenya and elsewhere – for example – have been viewed as 
a conspicuous indication of aid securitization and militarization (Bradbury and 
Kleinman 2009; Saferworld 2013). Scholars such as Lisa Smirl, however, have sought 
to deepen and develop this critique from a more sociological perspective, examining 
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the militarized and separated architectures which house contemporary aid workers 
and help facilitate their interactions with ‘locals’ (Bliesemann de Guevara 2016; Smirl 
2008, 2015, 2016). 
The sociology of international aid workers, or peacebuilders/peacekeepers, has 
also been the focus of a second body of work where the concern has been to analyse 
how international interveners view and approach their work and how they experience 
interaction with proximate Southern communities. For many, entry into this area of 
enquiry has come through critique of international actors who are unable to shift from 
a Western-centred, ‘blueprint’ worldview to one which takes account of local 
perspectives and priorities (Autesserre 2010; Lemay-Hébert 2009; Mac Ginty 2008). 
For others, the deleterious impact of ‘everyday’ practices of interveners – culminating 
in the creation of ‘peacekeeping economies’ – have been of central importance 
(Aning and Edu-Afful 2013; Edu-Afful and Aning, 2015; Higate and Henry 2004; 
Jennings 2014, 2015; Jennings and Bøås 2015).  
Critical to this article, though, is the way in which this latter literature in 
particular has introduced a coherent concept of the international interventionary 
community. The delineation of a separate ‘peacekeeping culture’ has not only 
highlighted the architectural and spatial barriers and divisions erected by 
internationals, but the whole ‘lifeworld’ of this community – including how they 
construct, often erroneous, understandings of societies they engage with (Autesserre 
2010, 2014; Rossi 2006). Analysts depict a group whose everyday living is calibrated 
to limit contact with the ‘local’ for fear of attack, disease or other risk, while mind-
sets engendered and preserved are those of separateness, privilege and difference 
(Autesserre 2014; Cain et al 2006). Duffield’s analysis of the fortified aid compound 
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brings these strands of literature together – with the compound standing not only for 
bunkerized space but bunkerized lifestyles.  
It is important, however, to clarify the two dimensions of bunkerization that 
Duffield and others have developed: militarization and remoteness. The compound 
constitutes part of the former, which also includes reinforced vehicles and security 
protocols. It also incorporates, however, the use of security and military forces to 
distribute or implement development or humanitarian goods – or, at least, to oversee 
these processes and ‘protect’ their providers. Thus one can see bunkerization in 
contexts where militarized compounds are less present, or wholly absent – such as 
eastern Chad, eastern Ethiopia or northern Kenya. 
The other side of bunkerization, however, is ‘remoteness’ – the physical 
withdrawal of international personnel from key sites. On the one hand, this involves 
internationals’ retreat to capital cities (sometimes in other countries) and engagement 
in periodic, brief ‘fly-in’ visits to areas in question. Throughout the 1990s, for 
example, many internationals dealing with war-torn northern Uganda based 
themselves in Kampala, while Nairobi became the home for many of their 
counterparts engaged ‘in’ Somalia – as Dubai and Jordan have become for 
internationals focused upon Iraq and Syria. This clearly has implications for the types 
of knowledge produced in Western diplomatic and developmental circles on regions 
beyond the metropolis (Fisher 2014; Roberts 2013). 
On the other hand, remoteness entails the growing transfer of responsibility 
for undertaking, managing and evaluating internationally funded interventions by 
national staff and NGOs who are rarely afforded the same security resources as their 
Northern counterparts. This perhaps affords these actors a greater degree of agency in 
terms of implementation - and, indeed, shaping knowledge production processes – 
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than might be possible under a more directly managed arrangement (Lewis and Mosse 
2006). It also, however, transfers security risks identified by internationals to the local 
level (Shaw 2005) and raises difficult questions about whether international 
interventions are being implemented as intended or even if they are informed by any 
real sense of community concerns on the ground (Sandstrom 2014). 
The inclusion of remoteness within our understanding of bunkerization is 
important for addressing one of the more central criticisms of the concept – its UN-
centricity. For Duffield, Autesserre, Henry and others focus heavily on UN 
peacekeepers and peacebuilders in their analyses. Their analyses therefore potentially 
aptly characterize phenomena in peacekeeping intervention sites such as Afghanistan, 
Somalia and South Sudan where the UN is the dominant international actor, but not in 
regions where the UN role is less central, such as parts of Ethiopia, Chad and 
Uganda.
2
 Incorporating remoteness into bunkerization, however, allows us to apply 
the concept to many other interventionary contexts and organizations – particularly 
those where UN norms and protocols are less stringently observed and where 
multiple, mid-sized interventionary enterprises are the norm. 
Where bunkerization’s analytical purchase remains somewhat weak, however, 
is in its explanation of the drivers of the phenomenon. For most commentators, it is 
the initiative and agency of international actors and organizations, which underlies the 
practice and mentality. While contestation of the material change in risk encountered 
by internationals in recent times forms a prominent part of this literature, broad 
agreement exists on the notion that internationals have deliberately driven the practice 
in reaction to perceived risk. This also appears to be the view of many practitioners 
themselves; Felix da Costa cites one INGO official in South Sudan’s observation that 
‘bunkerization is essentially led by donors’ (2012: 7). 
 12 
There is good reason, however, to query the decisiveness of this 
characterization. A range of literature, for example, has recently explored the extent to 
which access and security is ‘negotiated’ between internationals and governments in 
many parts of the South with security escorts and risk management plans imposed by 
the latter on internationals in an effort – in some cases – to strategically manage how 
Western knowledge on those states is produced (del Valle and Healy 2013; Fisher 
2014, 2015; Harvey 2013; Magone et al. 2011; Pottier 2002).  
    More broadly, many scholars have highlighted the agency of African states in 
the international system in a number of contexts, underlining the extent to which 
apparent relationships of dependency and domination are in fact imbued with 
opportunities for securing agency on both sides (Beswick 2010; Brown and Harman 
2011; Fisher 2012; Whitfield 2009). Mac Ginty, Richmond and other proponents of 
the ‘local turn’ in peace studies have also convincingly critiqued the dominance of 
Northern epistemologies and failed ‘liberal’ frameworks in the prosecution of 
peacebuilding initiatives by internationals. Instead, they have argued for a critical 
unpacking of local or indigenous agency in the emergence of sustainable peace 
practices in divided societies – both from a normative and pragmatic perspective 
(Mac Ginty 2008, 2011; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). These findings alone merit 
a more open approach to be taken to the question of what promotes and sustains 
bunkerization practices in many parts of the developing world.  
Moreover, much of what is highlighted on the architectural, operational and 
practical side of bunkerization resembles not only contemporary practices of 
governance and state consolidation in parts of the South but also much more historic 
ones – in some cases practices which have taken place since the precolonial era. The 
remainder of this article will therefore seek to re-frame the discussion on 
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bunkerization by ‘bringing the state in’. This will be undertaken firstly through the 
drawing of parallels between historic statebuilding practices and contemporary 
bunkerization, followed by an historically informed analysis of the drivers of 
bunkerization in Ethiopia’s SRS. 
 
 
Genealogies of bunkerization in central-eastern Africa 
 
In recent decades, many of the most prominent humanitarian crises – and focuses of 
international intervention in various forms – have been located at the peripheries of 
central/eastern African states. War in northern Uganda, genocide in Darfur, refugee 
crises in eastern Chad, conflict in the Ogaden, civil strife in southern Sudan – 
borderlands have been a focal point for suffering, atrocities, insurgency and counter-
insurgency for much of the recent past and thus have become the key sites for 
intervention, directly or otherwise.  
A key point to make in this regard is that these regions’ entry into the modern 
global system of states – and their subsequent governance – strongly reflect 
phenomena discussed and critiqued in the bunkerization literature. Though polities 
and systems of governance existed in all the examples cited above prior to the 
nineteenth century, the set of processes which led to their incorporation into the 
modern states of Uganda, Sudan
3
, Chad and Ethiopia and the forms of engagement 
they have continued to have with governments in Kampala, Khartoum, N’Djamena 
and Addis Ababa to this day closely resemble both militarization and remoteness, as 
discussed above. That is to say, state-making and state-building in the peripheries of 
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these four states has long been associated with the practices conceptualized as novel 
and Western-led in much contemporary intervention literature. 
The incorporation of parts of Darfur, western Ethiopia and southern Sudan 
into what eventually became (largely) Sudan by Turco-Egyptian forces (with British 
support) in the nineteenth century, for example, was undertaken violently and 
maintained through crude and exploitative military rule (Leonardi 2013; Gonzalez-
Ruibal 2011). Power centred around fortified garrisons or zaribas occupied by Turco-
Egyptian commanders and their retainers. Cherry Leonardi (2013) has vividly 
reconstructed the environments around these ‘clearly demarcated and exclusionary’ 
structures and the local economies which grew up around them – structures and 
processes which resemble, from this perspective, Duffield’s aid compounds and the 
development of ‘peacekeeping economies’ (Higate and Henry 2014; Jennings and 
Bøås 2015).  
Importantly, post-colonial Sudanese governments maintained a similar 
approach to ruling the south and west – northern commanders being the main 
representatives of the state – housed in military bases to govern and, where necessary, 
subdue the population (Rolandsen and Leonardi 2014; Deng Kuol 2014). Even 
members of the rebel Southern People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM – now the 
ruling party of South Sudan) have reflected on their militarized approach to engaging 
with and governing civilians in occupied territory they held between the 1980s-
2000s.
4
  
Similar observations can be made on the incorporation of modern SRS into 
Ethiopia. The region – populated primarily by pastoralist communities – was violently 
subdued by the imperial Ethiopian army in the later nineteenth century and left largely 
‘ungoverned’ by the centre save for periodic campaigns led by distant military 
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officers stationed in urban posts and fortified military structures (Hagmann 2014, 14; 
Markakis 2011: 134-148). The presence of the state in the region today does not look 
dissimilar.  
Faced with a separatist insurgency since the mid-1990s, the Ethiopian 
government has, in SRS expert Tobias Hagmann’s words, ‘returned to [the] garrison 
rule’ which characterized its presence in SRS for much of the twentieth century 
(Hagmann 2013). Indeed, Hagmann and Korf characterize successive Ethiopian 
regimes’ approaches to SRS in terms of Carl Schmitt’s and Giorgio Agamben’s ‘state 
of exception’ – noting that ‘physical violence meted out by subsequent Ethiopian 
governments has been a constant in the past 120 years’ (Hagmann and Korf 2012: 
209). In illustrating this point, Hagmann refers to topographic maps of the Somali 
region produced by Ethiopia’s official Mapping Agency during the 1970s ‘which 
depict major towns and settlements within the Ogaden as “military camps” with no 
reference made to the existing (Somali) names of these locations’ (Hagmann 2005a, 
532, note 6).  
North-western Kenya, northern and north-eastern Uganda and eastern Chad 
were also violently incorporated into their modern states by a combination of 
European and Turco-Egyptian colonial projects and have continued to be governed as 
enemy territory, to some degree, by state officials (Knight 2003). David Anderson, for 
example, traces the continuities between the militarized character of British colonial 
rule in northern Kenya – ‘always treated as a “special district” under a system of 
military administration…garrison government’ – and the post-independence regimes 
of Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) (Anderson 2014, 
660).  
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Perhaps most startling in this regard, though, was the militarization of much of 
northern Uganda during the 1990s and the forced displacement and encampment of 
millions of civilians by the Ugandan army in its war against the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (Dolan 2009). During this period, the state and the military were once again 
synonymous for many civilians; the president – Yoweri Museveni – temporarily 
moved the government to the region during the mid-1990s, not to oversee the 
humanitarian operation but ‘to command the army there himself’.5 
Remoteness has also been a central characteristic of state ‘presence’ in these 
regions since the nineteenth century. Thus in nineteenth/early twentieth century 
eastern Ethiopia and Darfur, local militias and auxiliaries were often employed as 
proxies to maintain state control by distant commanders – not unlike Khartoum’s 
approach to janjawiid militias in Darfur during the 2000s and Addis Ababa’s use of 
the liyu militia in SRS. Indeed, as Øystein Rolandsen notes, ‘throughout the history of 
Sudan as a state, autonomous armed groups have been employed as slave raiders, 
auxiliary troops, border police and…tools in government counterinsurgency 
campaigns…employing militias has become a standard procedure for successive 
regimes in Khartoum’ (2007: 165). 
More often, though, the state came to maintain its rule through relationships of 
(unequal) mutual dependency with local leaders (actual or appointed by state 
officials), particularly chiefs in southern Sudan/northern Uganda and clan elders in 
Somali-inhabited regions (Amone and Muura 2014). These selectively chosen actors 
became the voice and arm of the state in many of these peripheral regions owing to 
their perceived ability to mobilize support and to ‘translate’ the demands of 
government to distant communities which administrators were unwilling to reach out 
to themselves (Markakis 2011).  
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Significantly, though, these leaders were valuable because they could speak 
the language of their colonial or proto-colonial overlords (both literally and 
metaphorically) – something which was not a coincidence. Leonardi (2013) has 
shown, for example, how southern Sudan’s precolonial community leaders 
transformed into chiefs during their growing encounters with various manifestations 
of the state (hakuma) during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Over time, these 
leaders came to understand and appreciate how to most fruitfully position themselves 
vis-à-vis state representatives to maximize their own agency as de facto rulers at the 
local level. In so doing, they played an important and strategic role in managing the 
production of knowledge by both the hakuma and its citizens. 
This emerging class of brokers between ‘life worlds’ has not simply been a 
prominent feature of twentieth century governance in parts of southern Sudan, 
Uganda and Somalia but of the modern development enterprise (Mosse and Lewis 
2006; Rossi 2006). A key feature of bunkerization has been the transfer of 
responsibility for administration and operations to national staff and organizations. 
The selection of such ‘local’ brokers by international donors and INGOs, though, has 
been premised on a similar rationale to those of colonial and proto-colonial 
administrators: perceived ability to mobilize and represent communities, but 
familiarity with the world of the international.
6
 Moreover, as Clare Paine has 
demonstrated in the case of northern Uganda, for example, for some modern brokers 
an attempt to fit the profile of those of old ones – in this case the ‘paramount chief’ – 
has sometimes been a key strategy for building credibility with, and securing 
resources from, international interveners (Paine 2015). 
The intention of this overview is not to suggest that contemporary 
bunkerization practices are simply an unconscious extension of historic state-building 
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enterprises. Nor is it to imply that international intervention is heavily informed by 
the same militaristic, imperialist logics as the European, Turco-Egyptian and 
Ethiopian colonisers and expansionists highlighted above. The drawing of these 
parallels nevertheless underscores the enduring character of the state in many 
central/eastern African peripheries. That is to say, forms of engagement and 
interaction between state authority and local communities in many of these regions 
today continues to reflect the same logics of militarization and remoteness that 
informed initial encounters in the nineteenth century.  
This is a crucial lens through which to view the practices of modern 
international interveners, since development interventions do not occur unilaterally – 
they must, at the very least, come to some form of accommodation with the formal 
state authorities. In some cases this is a question of registration or permission, while 
in others a more regulated and continued negotiation of access is required. This 
applies particularly to UN and international donor agencies but also to INGOs – 
whose de-registration and expulsion by state authorities has occurred, and been 
observed, in Darfur, SRS and elsewhere in the last decade.  
The point, then, is that intervention does not occur in a vacuum – the state may 
be largely absent in the borderland but is still recognized, and usually referred to, as 
the presiding authority and determiner of movement and operation by internationals. 
The extent to which states in east/central Africa have shaped and managed the 
character of international interventionary presence in line with a persistent historical 
modus operandus of militarized encounters and remote governance is therefore a 
central, and largely unexplored, question. The degree to which interventions 
undergird these deleterious forms of rule in the African periphery – albeit 
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unconsciously – is also a crucial normative concern that arises herein. The remainder 
of this paper will explore this in the context of Ethiopia’s SRS region. 
 
 
Bunkerization in the Ogaden 
 
Internationals in SRS: A brief overview 
 
Contemporary Ethiopia is administratively a federal state divided, since 1991, into 
nine regional states. Under the current Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) ruling coalition, regional states have been created along ethnic lines 
as a means to break links with previous regimes perceived to have been highly 
centralized, dominated by an Amhara elite and unrepresentative of ethnic groups 
outside the highland ‘core’ of the country (Abbink 2011).  
One such state is SRS in the eastern part of Ethiopia, one of the largest in the 
country both in terms of area and population. Annexed to Ethiopia by the former 
Abyssinian empire in the late nineteenth century, the region once known as the 
‘Ogaden’ has remained on the margins of the Ethiopian polity both physically and 
politically ever since. Though governed by a native Somali administration in the town 
of Jijiga theoretically elected by Somali Ethiopians, the region’s rulers have in fact 
largely been the de facto appointees of the increasingly authoritarian federal 
government in Addis Ababa via its Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFedA) since the 
1990s and, indeed, (largely northern Tigrayan) Ethiopian military commanders 
(Hagmann 2005a, 516-517, 522; Hagmann 2005b; 2014; Khalif and Doornbos 2002). 
This is not to say that regional officials have not been able to carve out agency in their 
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relations with their federal counterparts, though it is clear that their authority derives 
from above rather than from below. 
SRS remains one of the poorest parts of Ethiopia and has received minimal 
investment from the federal government in terms of infrastructure and other forms of 
support. Economically, the region is largely dominated by pastoralists – a way of life 
federal officials, like their predecessors under the socialist Derg (1974-1991) and 
imperial regimes (overthrown in 1974), find difficult to understand, leading to the 
latter’s support for a range of clumsy and deleterious ‘villagization’ and 
sedentarisation programmes in the area (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). This 
perspective has fed into a broader view among Ethiopia’s highland rulers of SRS as a 
terra nullis requiring subjugation and civilising (Clapham 2002).  
The marginalization and under-development of the region has also been 
exacerbated by conflict in recent decades with the secessionist Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (ONLF) – ruling party of SRS between 1992-1994 – having waged a 
violent separatist campaign since leaving the EPRDF coalition in the early 1990s. The 
ONLF insurgency has been met with equal brutality by the Ethiopian military and the 
regional government’s – initially informalized – special forces, the liyu police.  
SRS has also largely been among Ethiopia’s more neglected regions for 
international donors. This disinterest has nevertheless begun to change since a major 
drought and famine struck the wider region between 2011-2012. Recent years have 
seen a number of states establish – or explore the possibility of establishing – longer-
term development interventions in this part of Ethiopia. Most notably, the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) launched a multi-million pound 
‘Peace and Development Programme’ (PDP) in the early 2010s (initially as an 
inception mission, though operational in part since 2013) focused on four components 
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– service delivery, fostering of greater professionalism and accountability in the 
security and justice sectors, assisting in the creation of livelihood opportunities for 
pastoralist communities, and improving governance. DFID operations are managed by 
a consortium of INGOs and NGOs under Save the Children, including the 
International Rescue Committee, Islamic Relief, Ogaden Welfare and Development 
Association, Mercy Corps, Oxfam and ZOA (DFID 2013). Since 2013, the German 
and Swiss development agencies (GIZ and SDC) have begun to plan for, and trial, 
interventions focused around capacity-building for drought resilience among Somali-
Ethiopian communities, while the US – Ethiopia’s leading bilateral donor, but a 
relatively minor player in SRS – has primarily focused on food and water security 
programmes.
7
  
A number of UN relief agencies operate in the region particularly focusing 
around refugee camps, notably the World Food Programme (WFP) which is housed in 
defensive compounds in Gode, Dollo Ado and Degehabur. UNHCR also has an office 
in Jijiga – the regional capital – and the UN runs a small ‘guest house’ there for 
visiting international staff (UNDSS Ethiopia 2014). Though UN security advisers and 
liaisons are stationed in a number of these locations, they are invariably ‘national’ 
rather than international in origin. Finally, the World Bank has run a community-
based development programme for the region’s pastoralists (the Pastoral Community 
Development Project, PCDP) since 2003. Most of these programmes are implemented 
by the federal or regional government or by the many humanitarian INGOs and NGOs 
in the region, most notably Mercy Corps, Oxfam, Save the Children and ZOA together 
with a range of consultancy groups, implementing agencies and security outfits.
8
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Drivers of bunkerization – the role of the Ethiopian state 
 
The difficulties of accessing many parts of SRS together with the perceived high level 
of insecurity there arguably render it an ideal candidate for bunkerization behaviour 
and mentalities among international actors. Indeed, at one level there appears to be a 
high level of militarization and remoteness in the character of international 
interactions with civilians, communities and organizations in the region.  
Few internationals are permanently based in SRS, and visits by international 
personnel are often heavily restricted by a donor/agency headquarters for both 
security and practical reasons. Indeed, according to interviewees, brief trips beyond 
Jijiga are often made only with Ethiopian military escorts and equipment, or with UN 
logistical support – often in the form of reinforced vehicles or helicopters.9  
Several donors, notably the World Bank, rely heavily on UN security 
recommendations and advice with regard to sending internationals into the area even 
for short trips
10
; the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) provides a 
weekly précis of security ‘incidents’ across the country for interested actors and 
advises internationals – and a number of other communities – on the perceived 
relative risks of travelling to particular areas. The proposed German-Swiss 
intervention noted above was to proceed only after the completion of a risk 
assessment exercise undertaken by an external consultant – whose report, which was 
in the process of being written at the time of the fieldwork, sets the parameters for this 
initiative – and, indeed, was to define GIZ and SDC’s understanding of the SRS 
context.
11
  
Moreover, the UN presence in the region takes its most prominent form in 
militarized compounds; bunkered structures surrounded by barbed wire separating 
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local and international space. For international consultants and NGO personnel 
working in the region – usually under the commission of the UN, an international 
donor or an INGO – UNDSS or other institutional security advice has often 
compelled these actors to remain behind compound walls – particularly in Gode – for 
much (if not all, as one consultant interviewed noted) of a trip to the region.
12
 
In terms of operations, international actors rely heavily upon their Ethiopian 
government counterparts, both civilian and military, in some contexts to deliver 
aspects of their programmes in the region. A 2010 review of development 
interventions in the region, for example, noted that WFP ‘hands over all relief food to 
the Government of Ethiopia at the time of its arrival…in the country [for 
distribution]’ (DAG Ethiopia 2010: 22). 
International encounters are also characterized by a strong degree of 
remoteness. Visits by internationals to the region are usually brief and heavily 
circumscribed. Current and former diplomats, consultants and humanitarian personnel 
have described how their trips have largely focused around meetings with regional 
state political and judicial officials (often in Jijiga) as well as with diaspora returnees 
from Europe and representatives of INGOs and implementing agencies tasked with 
delivering donor programmes. Encounters with ‘locals’ who are not part of the state 
elite (federal or regional) or the development community are therefore extremely rare.  
International donor-funded interventions are also largely implemented, and 
often evaluated, by increasingly distant chains of consortia and implementing 
agencies, often run and managed by local NGOs. On the one hand, this increases 
room for local agency in the management of these programmes. On the other hand – 
however – it expands the physical, emotional and epistemological gap between the 
life worlds of internationals and locals. This leads to an arguably circular and 
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restricted production of knowledge. In a September 2013 review of the nascent PDP, 
for example, DFID officials did not incorporate a field visit into their evaluation, but 
instead held meetings with implementing partners and representatives of the 
Ethiopian state to inform their analysis (DFID Ethiopia 2013: 8).  
This was considered justifiable given the very early stage of the PDP’s 
development and operationalization at that time. The episode reflects, nonetheless, the 
more general character of international involvement in the region – where chains of 
organizations not only help design and implement interventions but also represent the 
primary (sometimes sole) sources of information on the region and its peoples for 
their international interlocutors. This has both epistemological as well as practical 
consequences, as Sandstrom has similarly noted in relation to internationals’ 
‘remoteness’ in Afghanistan (Sandstrom 2014). 
One should, of course, be careful about essentializing international 
engagement in SRS. Security and visit protocols, risk assessment guidelines and 
training requirements vary considerably across headquarters and are rarely observed 
to the letter by international staff who travel to the region in person. Likewise, it was 
clear from interviews that many of the latter have sought to resist or work around such 
HQ-imposed restrictions and that a number relied more on their own extensive 
experience of working in SRS – and networks developed therein – to ensure their own 
safety.
13
 As Felix da Costa and Karlsrud (2013) have noted in relation to South 
Sudan, there is also some evidence of internationals seeking to establish ‘ways to 
stay’ in the region when this is against the broader security protocols.  
The provenance of this general bunkerization behaviour, however, is open to 
question. For while HQ diktats and a generalized culture of risk clearly shape the 
form of international intervention in SRS for many interviewees, the role of the 
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Ethiopian state was more often highlighted. Attempts to establish a permanent, non-
militarized footing in the region by one major donor in recent years, for example, 
were rebuffed by Addis Ababa.
14
 A range of personnel from a variety of organizations 
also noted that Ethiopian military escorts were in fact imposed sine qua non for many 
internationals seeking to travel beyond Jijiga – and that permission to do so would be 
denied or vehicles turned around at roadblocks otherwise.
15
 
Moreover, many interviewees claimed that building the Ethiopian state 
(sometimes including, usually indirectly, the military) into the implementation of 
interventions was, in fact, often a prerequisite for the state’s granting of approval for 
the programme to take place. Internationals universally noted that their interventions 
had to be fully ‘aligned’ with the Government of Ethiopia’s (GoE) National 
Development Plan in order to be approved and permitted to operate.
16
 Most 
interviewees could also recall at least one occasion during their tenure when the GoE 
had ‘refused’ project or programme aid or expelled a colleague when the 
interventions proposed or part-implemented had not fitted in to the Plan.
17
 Many 
stressed that their interventions were allowed to take place only through the existing 
state apparatus – with a range of state coordination bodies, notably MoFedA and the 
Bureau of Pastoral Affairs.
18
 Moreover, one donor official noted that his programme 
had needed to agree with the GoE beforehand which woredas (the smallest unit of 
local government in Ethiopia) the project would operate in with a range being ‘jointly 
agreed’ as too dangerous to enter.19 
The Ethiopian state’s management of space which internationals can access in 
SRS has been a central and longstanding characteristic of its engagement with this 
community and represents, in part, a strategic attempt to prevent the production of a 
non-EPRDF-sanctioned knowledge on the insurgency and counter-insurgency
20
. 
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Between 2007-2008, state officials heavily restricted humanitarian access to parts of 
SRS at the height of the ONLF insurgency between 2007-2008 and expelled a number 
of organizations viewed as assisting the group (including Medecins sans Frontiers, 
MSF) (Binet 2011). Many have only recently returned at the time of writing. In the 
name of balance and providing a broader context, it should be noted that UN and 
other internationals also became the targets of increased numbers of kidnappings, 
killings and other violence by the ONLF during this period (Powell 2007; Voice of 
America 2011). 
At the time of fieldwork fewer restrictions existed, although respondents 
emphasized the non-negotiability of international access to areas of SRS cited as 
international no-go areas by officials in Jijiga and Addis Ababa. Both the PDP and the 
World Bank’s PDCP, for example, were allowed to proceed only in areas specifically 
agreed with state officials with certain proposed locations ‘bluntly’ refused by 
Ethiopian state interlocutors. Addis Ababa has also imposed strict thematic limits on 
donor involvement – with the Safety and Justice element of DFID’s PDP being 
suspended a fortnight into its design phase owing to the perceived sensitivity of the 
topic.
21
 One senior official opined that ‘the security services saying no’ represented 
the biggest impediment to access in most of the region while several consultants and 
donor officials argued that they had been able to move more freely in Afghanistan and 
Somalia than in much of SRS for similar reasons.
22
 
Importantly, the GoE’s management of international space has also been 
complemented by an attempt to manage network building by internationals – and, 
thus, ‘sources’ of knowledge. Thus, virtually all respondents described the 
complexities of building links in the region beyond groups and actors aligned with the 
military or regional/federal government. A particular concern in this regard was the 
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military and political establishment’s frequent flagging of particular communities as 
being linked to, or sympathisers of, the ONLF and thus ‘out of bounds’ to 
internationals. Many respondents noted that the vagaries of this messaging 
discouraged internationals from seeking to establish unmediated relationships with 
those in SRS.
23
 Several international; officials highlighted the frequent insistence of 
the regional government that its advisers accompany them on any trips in the State 
and that only its approved staff, including interpreters, be used. Indeed, one official 
noted that an attempt to add an additional interpreter to the security escort selected by 
regional officials on one such trip led to a heated and sustained disagreement.
24
 
To some extent, this promotion of more militarized and remote encounters 
between internationals and locals by the Ethiopian authorities is a consequence of 
several aspects of Ethiopian political culture. Firstly, successive Ethiopian regimes 
have operated within a context of institutionalized secrecy, suspicion of external 
actors and reluctance to share information without necessity (Hansen 2006; Vaughan 
and Tronvoll 2003). This has been augmented under the current EPRDF regime, 
which came to power largely without international support and emerged from a 
disciplined and necessarily secretive guerrilla movement. 
Moreover, the EPRDF has relied heavily upon international donor support 
since early in its tenure and has worked hard to limit international exposure of issues 
– such as counter-insurgency tactics in SRS – which might imperil this assistance 
(Fisher 2013). Finally, the EPRDF has adopted a resolutely independent approach to 
domestic policy – promoting a coherent and comprehensive vision for a top-down 
‘developmental state’.25  
Within this dispensation, development policy has been viewed as something 
which should be heavily state-owned and which international actors should either 
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align with or take their funding elsewhere (Dereje 2011; Furtado and Smith 2009). 
This focus on ownership and independence – dubbed ‘Ethiopian exceptionalism’ by 
one interviewee
26
 – can partly be explained by the ideological robustness of the 
EPRDF regime and its leadership (at least until 2012) coupled with Ethiopia’s history 
as one of Africa’s only states to have not been colonized (the brief Italian occupation 
during the Second World War notwithstanding). Cultural suspicion of the intentions 
of foreign powers within the Ethiopian elite also contribute to this way of thinking of 
and engaging with the outside world; as one Ethiopian official argued, ‘in Africa, the 
problem is that if you are weak you will be manipulated’.27 
One cannot, however, discount the influence of historical practices of 
statebuilding by Ethiopian administrations in the region now known as SRS on 
contemporary practice. For while the EPRDF’s overall approach to statebuilding 
differs markedly from its Marxist and imperial predecessors, engagement in the 
Ogaden differs little (Hagmann and Korf 2012). Indeed, as one SRS state official 
suggested, ‘the main difference for many in the region under EPRDF is that the 
soldiers are Tigrayan not Amhara’ – a reference to the initial reconstitution of the 
Ethiopian military around the Tigrayan TPLF under the EPRDF, and the continued 
prominence of TPLF figures in the higher ranks of the military in particular.
28
 As 
Hagmann notes, ‘successive Ethiopian regimes perceived government action in the 
Somali Region primarily in military rather than political terms’ (Hagmann 2005a, 
512). 
In this context, it is possible to link Ethiopian state approaches to governing 
SRS to bunkerization behaviour among international interveners. For Ethiopian 
officials, the modus operandi of engaging the region has historically focused around 
militarized and distant encounters and this has been the behaviour promoted by Addis 
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Ababa and Jijiga among external actors. That is to say, the bunkerization of aid in this 
region has not simply been a donor-driven phenomenon. International bunkerization 
in SRS is instead most usefully seen as an historical form of engagement between 
state actors and local communities now reproduced among external interveners at the 
instigation of their Ethiopian state hosts.  
 
 
Concluding thoughts: Sovereignty, peripheries and state-building in the era of 
bunkerization 
 
When presenting this article’s argument in a range of settings in Africa, Europe and 
North America during 2014-2016, one qualification suggested by several thoughtful 
respondents focused around the strength or hardness of the state concerned. Thus, 
where state drivers of international bunkerization could be convincingly argued for in 
strong states – such as Ethiopia, Rwanda or Sri Lanka – the story was less persuasive 
in the case of weaker ones.  
While accepting the different degrees of influence state actors have on the 
behaviour of internationals in their territories, this article has nonetheless sought to 
construct its argument less around the strength or weakness of a state and more 
around how peripheries and borderlands have been incorporated into these states. It 
has then explored how external relations with local communities during and since this 
period of incorporation have come to be reproduced by successive administrations 
and international interveners. This focus on borderlands allows for the incorporation 
of traditionally ‘strong’ states such as Ethiopia into the analysis alongside weaker 
ones such as Sudan and Chad. Moreover, this approach acknowledges the growing 
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ambivalence among Africanist scholars on the degree of choice exercised by African 
states (including inter alia Uganda, DRC and South Sudan) in projecting strong or 
weak state presence in parts of their territories (Fisher 2014; Schomerus and de Vries 
2014).  
In highlighting the agency of African states in driving the bunkerization 
process the study does not, of course, deny the prominence and provenance of 
Western actors, mind-sets and norms – some of which can indeed be argued to flow 
from colonial mentalities and structurings of space, sovereignty and the ‘other’. Nor 
does it seek to deny the complex interactions between historical patterns of behaviour 
and engagement and the conscious, intended actions of individual state actors and 
groups in the present. The aim of the article has been to highlight the state role in a 
process so far understood primarily in terms of novelty and Western agency rather 
than to resolve the structure-agency debate. 
The article’s findings nonetheless raise broader, more challenging questions 
for the international intervention community. The Ethiopian state has not been alone 
in promoting bunkerized behaviour – Karlsrud and Felix da Costa (2013) highlight, 
for example, the role of the Chadian state in imposing military escorts on 
humanitarian workers in its eastern periphery. Goodhand (2010) emphasizes the Sri 
Lankan government’s successful politicization and securitization of the presence of 
humanitarian organizations in that country during, and since, its civil war. Indeed, 
state restrictions on the movement and remits of internationals have increased 
considerably in recent decades and many states, including Sudan, Rwanda, Chad, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have become steadily more confident in their use of 
sovereignty norms to expel or circumvent the activities of external actors on their soil 
(Fisher 2015; Magone et al 2011; Tull 2010). This raises questions not only about the 
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plight of increasing numbers of communities cut off from humanitarian assistance but 
about how those in the policy and humanitarian world can access ‘ground truth’, in 
Duffield’s words, on these communities – and thus even identify a humanitarian crisis 
in the first instance.  
In the case of SRS, international respondents often discussed their approach to 
engaging in the region in terms of doing it ‘their [the GoE’s] way’ but pushing ‘little 
by little’ for greater room or undertaking ‘what we can get away with’. The quandary 
becomes, however, where internationals should draw the line in terms of allowing 
their incorporation into state-building practices in parts of the South as vehicles for 
possible future greater humanitarian or developmental autonomy. A number of 
respondents, for example, felt uncomfortable about the perceived link between 
international intervention and the GoE’s sedentarisation programmes, while others 
highlighted recent accusations of proposed UK funding for liyu paramilitaries in SRS  
(Quinn 2013; see above).  
It is increasingly apparent that a range of polities now view the international 
system as something to be incorporated into a broader process of – often semi-
authoritarian – statebuilding rather than a set of ad hoc actors to be negotiated with 
bilaterally and periodically (Fisher and Anderson 2015). Across eastern and central 
Africa particularly, many states no longer permit interveners the ‘choice’ of 
supporting them or engaging in other activities outside of their structures. This 
trajectory is not without its advantages, of course, – greater humanitarian and 
developmental coordination can be a positive thing even in semi-authoritarian states, 
depending on the commitment of these states’ governments to delivering 
humanitarian and developmental goods and resources. Moreover, from a normative 
perspective, one could argue that unsupervised and untrammelled interventions by 
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international actors is anachronistic, neo-colonial and should, indeed, be a thing of the 
past.   
Ultimately, though, this article has not linked bunkerization and remoteness to 
the empowerment of communities and citizens in Africa but to longstanding processes 
of militarized governance and state-building by national elites and their colonial 
predecessors. Many of the contemporary governments being referred to in this regard 
are building their states around rent-seeking, particularism, exclusion and oppression, 
delivering macro-economic growth, in many cases, but distributing the dividends 
quite unequally (Jones et al 2013).  International actors working in these countries and 
regions must therefore increasingly face up to the fact that their interventions form 
part of a broader enterprise – the creation of illiberal and ultimately deeply unstable 
authoritarian states. 
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Notes  
                                                        
1
See, for example, data available at https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/country and 
https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/contexts. 
2
 Duffield acknowledges this critique in his work (2010: 470). 
3
 The modern ‘Sudan’ in this section refers to the territory internationally recognized as the Republic of 
Sudan between 1956-2011 and includes what became the Republic of South Sudan in 2011. 
4
 Discussions with six former SPLM insurgents, Addis Ababa, 8 March 2014 and 27 April 2015. 
5
 Interview with former senior Ugandan security official and army officer, Kampala, 25 April 2013 
6
 (On the latter) Interview with UK official 1, Addis Ababa, 5 March 2014; Interview with World Bank 
official 1, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2014; Interview with US official, Addis Ababa, 11 March 2014; 
Interview with Swiss officials 1 and 2, Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014; Interview with German 
implementing agency official, 12 March 2014; Interview with risk analysis consultant working in SRS, 
Addis Ababa, 13 March 2014; Interview with UN official 1, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Interviews 
with UN officials 1, 2 and 3, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Discussion with five employees of 
implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 
2014; Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18 
March 2014. 
7
 Interview with US official, Addis Ababa, 11 March 2014; Interview with Swiss officials 1 and 2, 
Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014; Interview with German implementing agency official, Addis Ababa, 12 
March 2014. 
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8
 Interview with European consultant  (formerly commissioned by bilateral donor agency to work in 
SRS) 1, by telephone, 17 February 2014; Interview with World Bank official 1, Addis Ababa, 7 March 
2014; Interview with UN official 1, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Interviews with UN officials 1, 2 
and 3, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Interview with World Bank official 2, Addis Ababa, 18 March 
2014; Discussion with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral 
donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 
and 3 and UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014. 
9
 Interview with UN official 1, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Interviews with UN officials 1, 2 and 3, 
Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Discussion with five employees of implementing agency working for 
multilateral and bilateral donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Discussion with three INGO 
officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014. 
10
 Interview with World Bank official 1, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2014. Larger bilateral missions such as 
those of the US, UK and Germany appear less reliant upon UNDSS advice, though depend on similar 
information compiled from their own security sources. 
11
 ibid; Interview with Swiss officials 1 and 2, Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014; Interview with German 
implementing agency official, Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014; Interview with risk analysis consultant 
working in SRS, Addis Ababa, 13 March 2014. 
12
 Interview with European consultant  (formerly commissioned by bilateral donor agency to work in 
SRS) 1, by telephone, 17 February 2014; Interview with risk analysis consultant working in SRS, 
Addis Ababa, 13 March 2014; Interview with UN official 1, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Discussion 
with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral donors in SRS, 
Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN 
official 4, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with European consultant  (formerly commissioned 
by bilateral donor agency to work in SRS) 2, Nairobi, 14 July 2014. 
13
 ibid. 
14
 Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18 
March 2014. 
15
 Discussion with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral 
donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with World Bank official 2, Addis Ababa, 18 
March 2014; Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis 
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Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with European consultant  (formerly commissioned by bilateral 
donor agency to work in SRS) 2, Nairobi, 14 July 2014. 
16
 Ibid; Interview with UK official 1, Addis Ababa, 5 March 2014; Interview with World Bank official 
1, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2014; Interview with US official, Addis Ababa, 11 March 2014; Interview 
with Swiss officials 1 and 2, Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014; Interviews with UN officials 1, 2 and 3, 
Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014. 
17
 ibid. 
18
 ibid.  
19
 Interview with World Bank official 1, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2014. 
20
 For other regional examples of this phenomenon, see Fisher (2014) on Uganda and Pottier (2002) on 
Rwanda. 
 
21
 Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18 
March 2014. 
22
 Interview with Swiss officials 1 and 2, Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014. 
23
 Discussion with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral 
donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with World Bank official 2, Addis Ababa, 18 
March 2014; Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis 
Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with UK official 4, Nairobi, 10 July 2014; Interview with European 
consultant  (formerly commissioned by bilateral donor agency to work in SRS) 2, Nairobi, 14 July 
2014. 
24
 Interview with German implementing agency official, Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014. 
25
 Interviews with senior Ethiopian officials 1, 2 and 3, Addis Ababa, 1 and 2 March 2013, with senior 
Ethiopian official 4, Nairobi, 21 October 2014 and with senior Ethiopian officials 5 and 6, Addis 
Ababa, 27 April 2015. 
26
 Interview with World Bank official 2, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014. 
27
 Interview with senior Ethiopian official 3, 2 March 2014, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
28
 Interview with SRS official, Addis Ababa, 19 March 2014. 
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